Although economic theory supports the use of extended producer responsibility (EPR) to stimulate prevention and recycling of waste, EPR systems implemented in Europe are often criticized as a result of weak incentives for prevention and green product design. Using a stylized economic model, this article evaluates the efficiency of European EPR systems. The model reveals that the introduction of static collection targets creates a gap between theory and implementation. Static targets lead to inefficient market outcomes and weak incentives for prevention and green product design. The minimum collection targets should be complemented with a tax on producers for the non-collected waste fraction. Because such a tax internalizes the cost of waste disposal, more efficient price signals will lead to better incentives for waste management in a complex and dynamic market.
Introduction
Extended producer responsibility (EPR) has been widely applied in Europe as a policy instrument to stimulate prevention and recycling of consumer waste. EPR imposes collection and recycling targets on producers or importers of products such as packaging, batteries, electronic equipment, cars or lubricants. The wide variety of products has led to sector-specific EPR targets at the European level that are transposed in national or regional legislation. For example, packaging producers are required to collect at least 55% of packaging waste for recycling (directive 2004/12/EC) and, since 2012, European battery producers are obliged to collect 25% of the batteries sold (45% in 2016directive 2006/66/EC). In order to achieve these legally-imposed targets with minimal transaction costs, producers typically finance one national collective Producer Responsibility Organization (PRO) that subsidizes waste collection and recycling facilities. As PROs are organized nationally (or even regionally) structure and activities can diverge significantly across countries. The achievements of EPR look impressive, for example 3 million tons of European packaging waste are collected annually for recycling and 37,000 tons of spent batteries are diverted from landfills to recycling (EBRA, 2011; PRO Europe, 2010) . In addition to the existing achievements, a more intensive use of EPR is expected to improve green product design, prevention and recycling (Bio IS, 2012; Rotter, 2011) .
In spite of the achievements in terms of recycling, EPR evokes recurrent criticisms: the inflexible targets may lead to excessive costs, financial incentives for prevention or green product design are too small, and continuous improvement is not stimulated (Febem, 2011; Lindhqvist and Lifset, 2003; Rotter, 2011; Sachs, 2006; Short, 2004 ) . This article evaluates the validity of these criticisms and investigates how these shortcomings can be remediated.
Economic theory has studied EPR mechanisms extensively. The risk of illegal waste disposal by households makes it difficult to charge the full cost of waste management to households. As markets can only achieve an efficient, i.e. societally desirable, outcome if prices incorporate all costs inclusive environmental damage, waste management is subject to market failure. If household waste is underpriced, incentives to prevent and sort waste are limited, leading to large streams of mixed residual waste. From the point of view of economic scholars, EPR is a doublesided instrument that combines a sorting subsidy with a product tax. The sorting subsidy stimulates consumers to sort waste and the product tax stimulates households to prevent waste. Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995) and Palmer and Walls (1997) show that EPR is superior to other instruments, such as disposal fees, Dubois 37 take-back obligations and recycled content standards. Fullerton and Wu (1998) and Eichner and Pethig (2001) show that EPR stimulates green product design. Although the literature has also raised concerns about transaction costs (Calcott and Walls, 2005) , imperfect sorting (Aalbers and Vollebergh, 2008; Calcott and Walls, 2000) and collusion (Fleckinger and Glachant, 2010) , economists consider EPR as an important tool to remediate the market failure of cheap, subsidized household waste collection.
The contrast between nearly unanimous support from theoretical economists and the criticisms on implemented systems raises a paradox. This article addresses this paradox through the following research questions: Are the criticisms on European EPR mechanisms justified? Can EPR lead to an efficient outcome for waste management? Can implemented mechanisms be improved such that incentives for prevention and green design are strengthened?
In order to investigate the research questions, current implementation of EPR is compared with the mechanism described by the economic literature using a stylized model inspired by Palmer and Walls (1997) . EPR is addressed as a collective responsibility where producers finance one collective PRO that fulfills the legally-imposed targets. Alternatively, EPR could also be addressed as an individual responsibility. However, industry-wide implementation of individual responsibility is rare (Bio IS, 2012; Lindhqvist and Lifset, 2003) . As this article focuses on the impact of collection targets on prevention, green product design and sorting behavior, recycling targets are not explicitly discussed. The economic model shows that a gap has grown between economic theory and implementation of EPR. In order to bridge the gap, a policy recommendation is put forward that creates more efficient incentives for prevention and green product design.
The following section sets up a stylized economic model that identifies the first-best outcome in a hypothetical perfect world. This model will be used in the third section to compare EPR such as described in the economic literature with EPR implemented in Europe. As the model reveals that the gap between implementation and theory weakens incentives for sustainable waste management, a proposition is made to bridge the gap. The fourth section reviews information requirements and innovation incentives under current EPR mechanisms. A final section provides a summary of the policy recommendations.
The model
In this section we lay down the basic building blocks for an economic model. In order to explain the economic intuition as clearly as possible, reality is represented in a stylized way that makes an abstraction from specific aspects, such as European spatial differences, fixed costs or environmental emissions from production and recycling. The structure of the model is in line with European packaging legislation that defines one target per material type. Although the intuition of the model applies to a broad range of EPR waste streams, the current model is written specifically with packaging waste in mind. Consequently, in order to assess the relevance of the analysis for other waste streams, the model must be extended to deal with stream-specific issues, such as targets expressed in weight per inhabitant, long life cycles or assignment of costs between producers in the case of multi-material goods. Although the model does not include learning effects and innovation in the first stage, the effects will be assessed in a later stage. The section is organized in three parts. First, a stylized diagram identifies the relevant market actors, the material flow and financial transactions. Then, the hypothetical situation is assessed in which a benevolent central planner with perfect information (i.e. the perfect government) imposes its decisions to maximize welfare in society. Finally, behavior of the different market actors is modeled in a decentralized market where government knowledge and authority is constrained and every actor pursues his own interests. Figure 1 shows the material flow, as well as the financial flow, in a stylized diagram with three actors (producers, consumers and the PRO) and two sinks (recycling and disposal). To underline the distinction visually the material flow is represented by bold arrows while the financial flow is represented by dotted lines.
Basic building blocks
Producers supply goods to consumers. The production cost c(β) increases more than proportional with investments in green product design β ∈ [0,1] : c′(β) > 0, ∈ c″(β) > 0. The higher β, the more packaging waste is prevented by product design. Constant economies of scale apply, i.e. the production cost does not change with produced volume. In addition to the production cost, producers face a tax t for packaging waste and a waste contribution fee for the PRO f. The tax is unlike the contribution fee because the tax is imposed by a central planner (government) that uses the funds at its own discretion, while the contribution fee is given to the PRO on the specific condition that the funds are used to achieve the legally-imposed collection targets. The amount of packaging used when investments in product design are zero is w. In line with Fullerton and Wu (1998) and Shinkuma and Managi (2011) , producers offer a range of products with diversified product design characteristics. Consumers will choose which level of product design will be purchased.
The model is rescaled to the level of a representative consumer that purchases q units at product price p (Mas-collel et al., 1995) . A consumer gains utility u(q) with u′(q) > 0, u″(q) < 0: the pleasure of an additional unit of consumption decreases gradually the more is consumed. After consumption, the representative consumer sorts out fraction α ∈ [0,1] of the packaging waste so that total quantity of sorted waste α[1-β] wq can be recycled. As sorting s(α) is considered a burden, utility loss increases more than proportionally with the sorting effort: s′(α) > 0, s″(α) > 0. Recycling is modeled in a stylized way where costs, emissions and revenues are zero. Although disposal of waste has a unit cost d for society, the consumer can dispose the residual mixed fraction [1-α] [1-β] wq for free. This free (or cheap) disposal of residual waste constitutes the market failure that justifies the introduction of EPR from the point of view of economic theory, as reviewed in the Introduction. The disposal cost includes the private cost of disposal P d and the environmental damage of disposal e d . In order to stimulate sorting, consumers receive a subsidy z for sorted waste. The subsidy can be, for example, money, as in the case of a deposit-refund for beverage packaging, but can also be the service of curbside collection offered for sorted waste.
First-best Pareto efficient allocation
This section derives the first-best outcome in a world where a hypothetical benevolent central planner (the perfect government) has perfect information and full authority to implement its decisions. The results of this section will later be used as a reference to evaluate policy measures in a more realistic world (the decentralized market) where governments are constrained in information knowledge and market actors maximize their own interests rather than the common good. Such a central planner would maximize welfare in society. Welfare is utility from consumption minus production costs, disutility from sorting and disposal costs (including environmental damage).
Max u q c q s
The First Order Conditions as represented in equations (3), (4) and (5) determine the first-best Pareto efficient allocation: costs from prevention, green product design and sorting are optimally balanced with disposal costs (including environmental damage) (Mas-collel et al. 1995) .
Equation (3) shows that the marginal cost to sort another unit should be equal to the cost of disposing this unit. Equation (4) shows that the marginal cost of investment in green product design should be equal to the marginal benefit, i.e. the reduction of sorting and disposal cost of an additional unit of packaging. Equation (5) confirms that the marginal utility of consumption should be equal to its full cost: the sum of production, sorting and disposal costs. If these three equations are respected, maximal welfare to society will be achieved. The efficient valuesdenoted with an asterisk-will later be used as a reference for further assessment.
To facilitate further analysis equation (3) is depicted graphically in Figure 2 in a stylized way, where s′(α) is a straight line through the origin and where an interior solution for the optimization problem exists. The figure depicts the dilemma faced by the hypothetical central planner. Raising the fraction of waste sorted, α, will increase sorting costs, as represented by the triangle with hatching under the marginal sorting curve. Simultaneously, raising the fraction of waste sorting reduces the disposal cost per unit of consumption represented by the rectangle with dark fill. In order to maximize welfare, the central planner minimizes the costs to society for waste treatment: the sum of the surface of the triangle and rectangle. The minimum surface, i.e. minimum costs, are achieved if the fraction of waste sorted equals α * .
Decentralized market
This section models the behavior of the three market actors in a decentralized market where government has imperfect information and limited authority so that every actor can pursue his/her own interests. First, under perfect competition the producer will set its product price to the marginal cost.
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Second, in a decentralized market every consumer maximizes his own utility. Rather than determining consumption on moral considerations about total welfare, a consumer determines consumption based on his/her budget constraint ω. Consumers can spend their budget on either a waste-generating product with price p or on the numeraire m, i.e. a product or service without waste production and value normalized to one (Mas-collel et al., 1995) . The numeraire represents the option of the consumer to spend his/her budget on other goods than the goods investigated within the scope of the article. As shown in equation (7), the representative consumer maximizes his/her utility from consumption subject to the budget constraint that includes expenditures from consumption minus revenues from refunds on sorted waste. Because utility of consumption is monotonically increasing, the equality sign in the budget constraint will always hold in optimum. Using equation (6), the Lagrangian can be formulated.
As the First Order Condition with respect to the numeraire gives λ = 1, the First Order Conditions equations (9), (11) and (10) that characterize consumer behavior can be calculated.
Equation (9) shows that a consumer will drive up his/her sorting effort up to the point where his/her marginal sorting cost equals the subsidy for sorted waste. More subsidies means more sorting. Equation (10) shows that a consumer will choose a product that has the right balance between product design and price: the marginal cost of investment in product design equals the avoided costs. Both a higher tax and a higher contribution fee increase the investments in green product design. This can be intuitively understood as the incentive to reduce packaging waste becomes stronger when the cost increases to put packaging waste on the market. In contrast, higher sorting subsidies lower the rate of green product design. Equation (11) shows that waste prevention is not only stimulated when the production cost or product taxes increase, but also when additional sorting efforts are required. In contrast, if the refunds on sorting efforts are generous, consumption goes up.
Note that EPR as a collective responsibility only creates strong incentives for green product design if the tax or contribution paid corresponds with the amount of waste created after consumption. This correspondence is typically strong in uncomplicated, fast-moving goods, such as packaging. By contrast, for multi-material goods with long life cycles, such as refrigerators, the PRO typically asks a uniform contribution fee, regardless of the materials used in the product. As the correspondence between contribution paid and waste produced in the end-oflife phase is weak, the incentives for green product design are also weakened.
Finally, as the PRO is created by producers to achieve the legally-imposed collection targets, it will make the necessary expenditures to achieve these targets. PROs are typically nonprofit organizations that work with a balanced budget in which all costs are assigned to producers via the contribution fees.
The gap between economic theory and implementation
In this section, the economic model described in the previous section is used to evaluate the impact of EPR policies on sorting behavior, green product design and prevention. First, EPR from the point of view of economic scholars, is compared with the first-best Pareto optimum. Second, EPR from economic theory is compared with EPR as implemented in Europe. Finally, a proposition is made to bridge the gap between both interpretations.
EPR economic theory
As reviewed in the Introduction, economic scholars consider that the low price of household waste collection is a market failure. Unfortunately, raising the price of consumer waste collection is difficult because illegal disposal by households is hard to control. A zero or low price for mixed waste breaks down the market efficiency because incentives to prevent or sort waste are weak. Economic theory shows that the negative effects of cheap household waste collection can be circumvented using a double instrument: a product tax combined with a sorting subsidy, such as defined in equation (12). Because the PRO has no role in this set-up, the contribution fee is zero.
Fill in equation (12) in equations (9), (10) and (11) to see that EPR, as defined by economists, delivers the outcome identical to the firstbest Pareto optimum, as described in equations (3), (4) and(5). As the first-best outcome cannot be improved, the tax-subsidy combination achieves the best achievable outcome, even in a decentralized world with constraints on government policy. The mechanism works as a deposit-refund. At purchase, consumers pay a deposit: a fee equal to the full disposal cost of the good after consumption. When consumers return sorted goods they get a subsidy equal to the deposit that stimulates sorting. In addition, as a fraction of the waste [1-α] ends up in the mixed waste, the total deposit paid is higher than the refund received. This difference compensates the costs (and environmental damage) for the treatment of mixed waste so that prevention and green product design are stimulated. This section demonstrated that EPR, such as described in economic theory, creates efficient incentives for green product design, prevention and sorting of waste in a decentralized market.
EPR implementation
We now turn to the actual implementation of EPR. As reviewed in the Introduction, European and regional legislation has implemented EPR through minimum collection targets. To investigate whether this mechanism can achieve the first-best outcome we start with the strong assumption that government has perfect insight in technology and market conditions so that they know the efficient collection rate: α * This sorting subsidy required to reach the legal obligation is equal to the optimal subsidy determined by economic theory. Therefore, implementation and theory of EPR lead to identical sorting behavior. As the PRO works with a balanced budget, the subsidies for waste collection are billed to the producers via the contribution fee. The contribution fee can be easily calculated.
Conversely to the outcome for the sorting effort, the disposal fee imposed via the PRO does not lead to the first-best outcome for green product design and prevention. Comparison of equations (12) and (14) reveals that the disposal fee of implemented EPR systems is lower than the optimal product tax of economic theory. Actually, the disposal fee is lower than the full cost of waste to society.
Equation (15) shows that a low contribution fee reduces the investment in product design to a level below the first-best outcome. This effect can be understood intuitively. Reducing the cost for waste management reduces the incentive to invest in green product design. Accordingly, equation (16) shows that a low contribution fee reduces the incentives for waste prevention. If consumption becomes cheaper, more will be consumed. This section demonstrated that implemented mechanisms with minimum collection rates do not even reach the first-best outcome under the strong assumption of perfect information. Skeptics that criticize EPR because incentives for prevention and green product design are too small have a valid point. The gap revealed by equations (15) and (16) can best be explained with the help of Figure 2 . In a first-best Pareto efficient context, the full cost of waste management is allocated to consumers. The full cost per unit of consumption is the sum of two components: the surface of the triangle that represents sorting costs and the surface of the rectangle that represents the disposal costs of residual mixed waste. The implemented EPR system is unlike the first-best scenario because only sorting costs are incorporated in the price of consumption. The disposal cost of mixed waste is not included, i.e. only the surface of the triangle is incorporated in consumer prices, the costs represented by the rectangle are passed on to society rather than on to consumers of wastegenerating products.
Proposition to bridge the gap
The previous section demonstrated that the gap between implementation and economic theory weakens waste management incentives. Consequently, if implemented EPR systems can be brought closer to the mechanism described by economic scholars, efficiency can be restored and incentives for prevention and green product design can be strengthened. In order to bridge the gap, the cost of the non-collected fraction has to be internalized. An additional tax, as proposed in equation (17), can internalize this remaining externality.
Filling equation (17) in equations (9), (10) and (11) shows that the combination of a legal target with a product tax on the noncollected fraction can achieve the first-best outcome, as derived in equations (3), (4) and (5) in a decentralized market. Graphically, the proposed tax incorporates the surface of the rectangle in Figure 2 . The first-best optimum can be restored without abandoning the implemented EPR structures.
To avoid additional transaction costs, the tax should be imposed on the already-existing PRO. If the PRO pays a tax on the non-collected fraction it will charge the additional costs via the already-existing producer contributions. Consumers will get the efficient price signal and producers will get efficient incentives for green product design. The proposition bridges the gap with economic literature without significant transaction costs.
Collection targets
The previous section showed that a tax imposed on the PRO for non-collected fractions improves incentives for green product design and waste prevention. This section reviews two other inefficiencies typically present in implemented EPR systems. The impact of the proposed tax on disposed fractions will be assessed for both aspects.
Imperfect information
The determination of the perfect collection target is highly information-intensive. Perfect insight is required in the consumer market, collection facilities and recycling technologies. Expecting that government has this perfect insight is unrealistic. European spatial differences in consumption and waste management practices makes the determination of the perfect collection target at the European level even more difficult.
Imposing a binding target with imperfect information can lead to two types of inefficiency. First, setting the targets too low, leaves environmental damage uncompensated. Even though the costs of waste sorting remain low, accrued disposal of mixed waste entails a welfare loss. The inefficiency is represented by the triangle with horizontal hatching in the left hand side of Figure 3 . This is, for example, the case for waste from electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) where the low European collection target of 4 kg per inhabitant contrasts with WEEE production of about 20 kg in Western Europe. Owing to the low target, less WEEE waste will be collected in Western Europe than in the first-best case and environmental gains will be foregone (European Commission, 2008) . Second, setting the targets too (17) high creates excessive costs. Although the costs of disposal decrease, the high sorting costs entail welfare loss. The inefficiency is illustrated by the triangle with horizontal hatching, as depicted in the right hand side of Figure 3 . This is exactly what happened in Germany during the start-up of the original Green Dot system (Duales System Deutschland). Over-ambitious targets lead to excessive costs that caused controversy and threatened continuity of the system (Reynolds, 1995) . The use of targets typically leads to cost inefficiency, either through excessive costs to producers or through external costs of environmental damage.
In contrast, if the PRO pays a tax on the non-collected fraction, as proposed above, determining the perfect targets becomes less stringent. Low targets can be complemented efficiently with a tax. Because the tax contains the right incentives for prevention, sorting and green product design, the PRO will move towards the first-best optimum without further government follow-up (Callan and Thomas, 2000; Palmer and Walls, 1997; Porter, 2002; Tietenberg and Lewis, 2010) .
Innovation and learning effects
The waste market is evolving rapidly. As materials in consumer products evolve, the composition of waste streams changes. Moreover, technological innovation is strong. New technologies make it feasible to collect and recycle more materials from waste streams.
However, imposed targets do not stimulate continuous improvement. If a PRO achieves the minimum target, it has fulfilled its role. As producers finance the PRO, they find it in their best interest to resist initiatives to collect more waste than legally required. Under such conditions, innovation and learning effects will lower the cost of waste collection, but will not lead to lower disposal rates. Figure 4 depicts learning effects by a flatter marginal sorting cost. In the first-best case, learning effects lead to a higher optimal sorting rate (α * increases up to α * Fut ). However, static targets do not contain an incentive for additional sorting (Callan and Thomas, 2000; Palmer and Walls, 1997; Porter, 2002; Tietenberg and Lewis, 2010) . The PRO will behave in line with the interest of producers. Unlike the first-best case, the PRO will not use the learning effects to increase sorting results, but will rather use the learning effects to reduce the contribution fees for producers. As depicted in Figure 4 , the PRO budget lowers with the rectangle with hatching. Such a reaction path seems to fit well with the example of packaging waste in Belgium. In line with the collection and recycling targets sanctioned by the European directive 94/62/EC and regional legislation, Belgian producers organized themselves in a PRO called Fost Plus. The recycled fraction rapidly rose and reached 79% in 2002. All legal targets were achieved and further progress leveled off. Seven years later, recycling was stagnant at 85%, while Fost Plus had reduced the contribution fee for producers by more than 40% (Fost Plus, 2010) .
Of course, perfect policy-makers may adapt targets regularly. Unfortunately, even though EPR legislation typically incorporates this possibility, targets are inert. Once determined, vested interests and lobbying make it difficult to change targets. The WEEE directive highlights the inert nature of targets. The sorting target of 4 kg per inhabitant was published in 2003. Even before publication, it was clear that the norm was low. Indeed, WEEE production is five times bigger than this target and is growing (European Commission, 2008) . It took until 2008 for the European Commission to make a draft to increase the collection norm. Although in 2012 consensus has been found between European institutions to increase the target, transition periods will postpone introduction until 2019, with additional delays for countries that lack the necessary infrastructure (European Commission, 2012). It takes more than 15 years to change the European collection norm for WEEE. Regional targets are not necessarily more flexible. In Belgium, where regions have jointly agreed collection targets, re-negotiation of these targets also takes several years.
Static targets slow down innovation in waste markets. A complementary tax on non-collected fractions, such as proposed above, changes the motivation of the PRO substantially. Increasing collection rates may increase the operational costs of the PRO, but simultaneously lowers taxes paid on the disposed fractions. If new collection or recycling technologies emerge, the PRO can increase its recycling rates while decreasing the contribution fee. As producers would encourage the PRO to innovate and improve environmental performance, the proposed tax on disposed fractions would create strong incentives for continuous progress. Since 2010, Fost Plus, the PRO for Belgian packaging waste, pays a tax of half a euro per inhabitant in addition to the minimum collection targets (Fost Plus, 2010) . Restructuring the tax so that the non-collected waste fraction is taxed rather than the given number of inhabitants strengthens the incentives for innovation and sustained improvement in waste management.
Conclusions and policy recommendations
A gap has grown between the understanding of EPR in the economic literature and European implementation. Static collection targets of implemented EPR systems do not fully internalize external costs of waste management and reduce the incentives for waste prevention and green product design. To overcome these shortcomings, this article proposes an additional product tax on the non-collected waste fraction. As the tax can be implemented via the already existing PRO, additional transaction costs are low.
The economic literature has abundant examples of the superior efficiency of taxes over targets. This debate also applies to EPR. Complementing the current static targets with the proposed additional tax would not only reduce information requirements for policy makers, but would also restore incentives for continuous improvement. The incentives provided by the proposed tax would stimulate the PRO to transform technological innovation in improved collection rates.
